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Since the 1987 Single European Act, the European Union has deepened its integration process. 
In the case of the determination of the common external tariff, deeper integration implies that the 
tariff reflected union-wide preferences. If integration is still shallow, though, the observed tariff 
will reflect the preferences of a pivotal national government. How governments voted, however, 
was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to test the deep vs. shallow 
integration hypothesis in an effort to shed light on how decisions are made in the EU. Results 
support the deep integration hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1987 Single European Act (SEA), the European Union (EU) has been rapidly 
moving towards closer political and economic integration. The SEA extended the power of the 
EU in areas such as social, environmental, and research and technology policy. Subsequent 
treaties have only deepened the integration process.  
These events suggest that the EU is increasingly resembling a single politically and 
economically unified country, rather than a collection of national governments participating in a 
customs union. Such development has important implications for how collective decisions are 
made on common policies such as trade. If the integration process is shallow (Cadot et al., 1999), 
trade policy will reflect bargaining between the member governments. Each government’s policy 
preference, in turn, is potentially influenced by domestic special interest groups. On the other 
hand, if the integration process is deep, the customs union’s trade policy is determined by a pan-
union institution, which in turn can be influenced by union-wide, rather than domestic lobbies. 
The question that arises then is, is policy-making indeed at the EU-level? The evidence 
suggests that it is. From its inception, authority on trade policy has been relegated to EU 
institutions, with a common external tariff adopted in 1968. Until 1987, national governments 
abided by a general principle known as the Luxembourg Compromise. Under this agreement, 
countries could veto decisions otherwise taken according to qualified majority1 in the Council of 
Ministers2 if they found them to be of vital national interest (Hine, 1985). The 1987 SEA not 
                                                
1 The Treaty of Rome (1957) provided for decisions to be made via qualified-majority, meaning that decisions 
required about 71 percent of the votes cast by each country in order to be passed. The Luxembourg Compromise did 
not change that rule, but merely introduced veto power. (Meunier, 2000). 
2 The Council of Ministers, which is the main decision-making body in the EU, is made up of ministers from each 
member state, with different ministers participating in the Council according to the subject under discussion—for 
instance, agricultural ministers discuss farm prices in the Agriculture Council, and economic and finance ministers 
discuss monetary affairs in the ECOFIN Council. Furthermore, each government acts as president of the Council for 
six months in rotation, thus allowing each country a turn in pursuing its own agenda (European Communities, 1999). 
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only extended the use of qualified-majority, but also resulted in the suspension of the 
Luxembourg Compromise (Meunier, 2000). This event caused a change in lobbying strategy. 
Before 1987, firms would lobby their own national governments, which would then bargain in 
the Council of Ministers to determine the common external tariff, using the veto to block any 
proposals that might hurt the domestic interests. After the SEA interest groups began to direct 
their resources towards lobbying at the EU-level (Mazey et al., 1993). Indeed, the number of 
interest groups in Brussels has significantly increased since 1987. In 1986, there were some 650 
groups that had been set up since the EU was first established in 1958 (Mazey and Richardson, 
2001); by 2000, that number had risen to nearly 3000 (Lehmann, 2003). 
This paper, then, exploits a unique dataset of 80 manufacturing industries from 1987 to 
2005 to examine whether the collective determination of the common European external tariff 
reflects deep or shallow integration. At the same time, light is also shed on the black box of 
European collective decision-making, since voting on the common external tariff took place 
behind closed doors (Schknecht, 1992). This implies that an indirect method is needed to infer 
how the national governments’ or EU-wide policy preferences have been translated into an 
equilibrium collective decision. 
If integration is shallow, the collective decision-making process can be modeled as a two-
stage process, as in Tavares (2006), who examined how tariffs were set before the 1987 SEA.3 In 
the first stage, interest groups lobby their national governments for protection of the industries 
they represent. Each government then selects a preferred tariff rate for that industry to maximize 
political support. In the second stage, then, countries vote in the Council of Ministers to 
                                                                                                                                                       
And since the EC deals simultaneously in so many areas of policy, it is possible for negotiations to cover a wide 
variety of topics and thus be subject to logrolling. 
3 That paper found that the common external tariff during that period reflected the preferences of the least 
protectionist country, suggesting unanimity. 
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determine the level of the common external tariff. The duty adopted will reflect the preferences 
of the pivotal government. 
The identity of the decisive member state, for its part, depends on how decisions are 
made. Three possibilities are unanimity, qualified majority, and simple majority. Since tariffs 
were declining over time during this period as a result of GATT4 trade rounds, proposals before 
the Council would have been to adopt a common external tariff that was lower than the status 
quo. This implies that the decisive government under unanimity will be the most protectionist 
member, since that is the one that needs to be convinced to accept lower tariffs. In the case of 
qualified majority, about 5/7 of the votes are required to pass a proposal. This implies that, if 
there are 7 member states, out of the 5 needed to pass the proposal, the government that is most 
likely to object is the one preferring the highest tariff. In other words, the decisive government in 
that case will be the one whose preferences are at the 71st percentile of the distribution. Finally, 
under majority rule, the pivotal government is the one whose preferences lie at the median.5  
Now, as Meunier (2000) pointed out, there is great uncertainty as to how decisions are 
actually made in the EU, though in general countries seek to reach a consensus. A way to 
achieve that is through logrolling, or vote trading. In the above discussion, it was assumed that 
member states had the same intensity of preferences. This is not a realistic assumption, as it is 
unlikely that, for instance, Germany would have the same preference for protecting its 
automobile industry as it has for protecting the footwear industry. Logrolling, then, allows such 
strong preferences to be given a greater weight. In other words, with logrolling, countries may 
trade votes on issues that are of less political importance domestically in exchange for votes 
favoring some proposal that is of greater political importance. This lets a country with a strong 
                                                
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which has been superseded by the WTO (World Trade Organization). 
5 Note that the position of the pivotal government depends not on the position of the status quo, but rather on the 
direction of the proposed change in tariff relative to the status quo.  
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desire to protect some key domestic industry to go along with a higher tariff on a good that is of 
much less importance so that it can get the high tariff it really wants and still be better off.6 
Because logrolling allows the intensity of preferences to be taken into account, the 
observed duty will reflect the preferences of a different decisive country than if it had not taken 
place. In particular, if proposals are to lower the tariff, the observed duty will reflect the 
preferences of a country that is more protectionist than in the case of simple or qualified 
majority, since the tariff rate will be higher than otherwise. This means that logrolling is 
regarded as another decision rule. 
In the case of deep integration, however, firms concentrate their efforts on lobbying at the 
EU, rather than at the national level. This situation would be analogous to a single country 
setting its trade policy. For instance, in the case of the U.S., firms must lobby Washington for 
protection, rather than their state capitals. This implies that the appropriate specification would 
be similar to the one used to explain U.S. tariffs. In particular, each national tariff preference 
would now have to be aggregated in some fashion, so that there would no longer be a single 
pivotal government. 
To answer the question of whether the EU’s common external tariff reflects union-wide 
preferences or those of a decisive government, the different decision rules reflecting the shallow 
integration case are tested against the deep integration hypothesis. As an identification 
mechanism, the member enlargements that occurred in 1995 and 2004 are used. Because the 
composition of members changed as new countries joined, there was a potential for the political 
                                                
6 Of course, countries may trade votes on different issues. For instance, Germany may agree to support Portugal in 
securing more agricultural subsidies in exchange for support in increasing protection of the automobile industry. 
Because this paper uses a partial equilibrium framework, it focuses only on vote trading for protection of different 
industries. Allowing countries to trade votes on other issues, however, would not alter the conclusions. 
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equilibrium to change, possibly in favor of a new member. This then provides for an additional 
source of variation in the data. 
Results suggest that the EU is indeed behaving like a single country when setting the 
common external tariff. These results are robust to various specification tests and to using the 
number of votes a country has in the Council of Ministers as weights.7 
This paper is divided as follows: section 2 presents the empirical strategy for determining 
which political-economy model best explains tariff rates. Section 3 describes the data, as well as 
the predictions. Section 4 provides the empirical results, while section 5 subjects these results to 
a variety of sensitivity tests. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Strategy 
2.1 Decisive National Government 
2.1.1 Stage one: Interest groups lobby national governments 
In stage one, standard political economy considerations establish the policy preferences 
of the national governments (Hillman, 1982; Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994).8 Since no assumptions are required about the means and type of lobbying that 
occurs in the EC, nor that groups that lobby are necessarily perfectly organized and seek to 
influence the entire structure of tariff rates, a general specification is used to motivate the 
empirical model. More specifically, tariff-setting governments in each country are regarded as 
choosing preferred industry tariff rates that result in a politically-optimal deviation from free 
trade. Letting pit  be the relative price of industry   i =1,K,n at time t; pit
!  the world price of that 
                                                
7 The unweighted specification tests the hypothesis that decisions are being made by the European Commission 
rather than the Council. This is included because it is the Commission that negotiates treaties on behalf of the EU. 
8 See Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) for empirical applications of the 
Grossman-Helpman model. 
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industry’s good (so that pit ! pit
"
= tit , the tariff rate on good i at time t), and ! it "( )  indicating the 
profit function for the industry, a national government’s political support function is 
! 
PSit = f " it pit( ) #" it pit
$( ), pit # pit$( )        (1) 
where the first argument indicates the gain in industry profits or rents, and the second term 
represents the loss in consumer welfare from the tariff. The determination of the preferred 
common external tariff for an industry therefore involves the interests of the industry through 
profits or rents; of domestic consumers of the commodity who seek to maximize their utility; and 
of the national government, which trades off industry and consumer interests to maximize 
political support. 
Empirically, to identify where countries rank in their preferences, one needs first to 
define the political support function. Because the focus of this paper is not on explaining the 
observed structure of protection across industries, but rather on shedding light on how collective 
decisions on the European common external tariff are made, the structure of the political support 
function comes not from a formal model, but rather from previous empirical studies (see Rodrik, 
1995, for instance). In particular, the literature predicts that protection is higher: 
• The larger the industry: the larger the industry seeking protection, measured as the share 
of employment in the industry, the greater is the incentive to be involved in the tariff-setting 
process. Furthermore, a large share of employment means the industry has more labor votes, 
which again increase protection. On the other hand, more employees makes it harder to organize 
as a result of the free rider problem, which in turn may decrease protection (Trefler, 1993). 
• The smaller the number of firms: a smaller number of firms alleviates the free rider 
problem in coordinating a lobby, thus increasing the level of protection. Many studies, however, 
find a positive, rather than a negative, effect. Hillman (1991) and Hillman et al. (2001), for 
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instance, view lobbying as a case of private provision of a public good, since when successful, 
there is a public good-type benefit—increased protection—to all firms in the industry. A larger 
contribution by one firm does not necessarily decrease the contribution of other firms. As a 
result, increasing the number of firms in an industry can either increase or decrease the overall 
lobbying effort. 9 
• The lower the wage: disadvantaged industries often receive more protection. An 
industry is disadvantaged if it is a low-skill, and hence low-wage industry (see Trefler, 1993). 
• The higher its labor intensity: the more labor intensive an industry, the more labor votes 
it has. This is measured by the labor cost share in production. 
• The lower the level of intra-industry trade: industries seeking protection will find their 
task harder if they must counter not only consumer dissatisfaction, but also producers who 
purchase their goods as intermediates (see Marvel and Ray, 1987). 
• The higher the import penetration: the higher the import penetration, the more will the 
affected industry lobby for protection, so as to decrease competition and maintain its market share 
(Trefler 1993). The theoretical literature, however, predicts an ambiguous relationship. In 
particular, the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model predicts that if industries are perfectly 
organized, protection should be higher in industries with low import penetration, and if they are 
not organized, the relationship between protection and import penetration should be positive. 
Models predicting a negative relationship include Mayer (1984), Hillman (1982), and Findlay and 
Wellisz (1982). Another problem with this variable is its potential endogeneity, since a higher 
tariff can lower import penetration. This will be dealt with in section 5. 
                                                
9 Pecorino (1998) analyzes this issue in a repeated tariff lobbying game where cooperation may be maintained 
through the use of trigger strategies, so that the difficulty of maintaining cooperation is measured by the critical 
value of the discount parameter. He finds that the effect of an increase in the number of firms on the ability of 
maintaining cooperation is indeterminate. 
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• The greater the rise in import penetration: declining sectors (those with large increases 
in import penetration) tend to receive more protection so as to reduce adjustment costs 
(Olarreaga et al., 1999). 
• The smaller the share of exports in production: export-oriented industries do not require 
protection either because they face no import competition or because, with intra-industry trade, 
protection will provoke unwanted foreign retaliation (Trefler, 1993). 
Finally, a dummy is included to control for the Uruguay trade round, which occurred 
more or less at the same time as the third enlargement.10 This is predicted to have a negative 
relationship with tariffs, since each trade round resulted in multilateral tariff reductions. The 
trade round dummy is used rather than year fixed effects because it generates a clear prediction.11 
To estimate each government’s preferred industry tariff rate, each country’s tariff rate 
from 1958 is used, which is before a common tariff was established. This allows the relationship 
between each country’s tariff and the various components of its political support function to be 
determined. The equation estimated is: 
! 
t
ic
= "
1
+ "
2
C
ic
+ #
i
+ $
ic
        (2) 
where 
! 
t
ic
 is the 1958 tariff rate for industry i and country c; 
! 
C
ic
is the vector of characteristics for 
industry i and country c;12 !
i
 is an industry-specific fixed effect, which is included to account for 
any unobserved factors that are common to all countries but vary by industry; and 
! 
"
ic
 is the error 
term. Results are shown in Table 1. 
                                                
10 The Uruguay Round began following the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, and concluded in 1993. 
11 To ensure this choice does not change the results, models including year fixed effects rather than the Uruguay 
Round dummy were also tested. 
12 Comparable industry data are not available for 1958. As a result, 1963 trade data were used together with 1963 
industry data for Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, and 1976 data for the UK and Ireland. 
Using solely the available 1963 data does not alter the conclusions. 
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The coefficients from the estimation of equation (2) are then used to predict each 
country’s preferred tariff over time, based on industry data from 1987 to 2005. Here it is 
assumed that the function determining each member government’s preferred tariff does not 
change. It is possible, and highly likely, that this function may in fact change over time as new 
governments with different ideologies assume power in each country. Although it would be 
possible to control for whether a country’s right wing party or left wing party is in office, it is not 
clear that it would play a major role in the determination of preferred tariff rates. For instance, in 
the U.S., Republicans favored high tariffs until the Great Depression and opposed them 
subsequently; the converse holds for Democrats. Still, the predicted preferred tariff rates are only 
used to rank order the countries in preferred tariff rates, not for estimation purposes. To check for 
robustness of the results, however, other methods for determining the decisive country are used. 
More details are given in section 4. 
 
2.1.2 Stage two: Voting in the Council of Ministers 
In the second stage, each minister of a member country arrives at the relevant Council 
meeting with his or her national government’s preferred tariff rate, as determined in the first 
stage. An industry in one country cannot at this point seek to influence a government in another 
country. That is, an industry in France can only affect France’s preferred tariff rate, not the 
preferred rate of Germany or Belgium. France’s representative may, however, exchange votes 
for a preferred trade policy with Germany or Belgium’s representative, so that voting may be 
affected by logrolling. Deliberations ensue and a vote is conducted to determine the common 
external tariff for the industry. The resulting tariff rate will be the duty preferred by the decisive 
national government.  
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Which national government is decisive in turn depends on how decisions are made. If the 
decision rule is unanimity, the observed tariff rate will reflect the preference of the national 
government with the most extreme preference. In other words, if the proposal is to lower the 
tariff, the national government favoring the highest tariff will be decisive, since this government 
needs to be convinced to lower the tariff.  
Under a qualified-majority rule, 5/7 of the votes in the Council are required to approve a 
proposal. This means that the decisive national government will be the one whose preferred tariff 
rate lies at the 71st percentile, assuming the proposal is to lower tariffs. This is because if there 
are 7 member states, for instance, the country that is most likely to object to a change in the tariff 
rate is the one with the most extreme position among the 5 that are needed to pass the proposal. 
Finally, if decisions are made using simple majority, the observed tariff will reflect the 
preferences of the median country, regardless of whether the proposal is to increase or decrease 
the tariff rate. 
However, given the opportunities that countries have at this stage to bargain and 
exchange votes for preferred tariff policies, tariff determination can also reflect logrolling. With 
decisions in the Council not directly observed, an indirect method is needed to determine 
whether logrolling took place, and therefore whether intensity of preferences was taken into 
account in collective decision-making. 
A logrolling situation exists if two issues are adopted as a package even though they 
would not pass separately. This occurs when there is an unequal intensity of preferences. If one 
member state feels very strongly about protecting some key domestic industry but not about 
protecting the key domestic industry of another member state, the countries will have an 
incentive to trade votes with one another. For example, if Portugal has a strong preference for 
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protecting its footwear industry, but is not concerned about the automobile industry, while 
Germany really wants to protect its automobile industry, but has no strong preference for the 
footwear industry, they have an incentive to trade votes. Portugal will agree to vote for the 
increased tariff in the sector Germany cares about, in exchange for Germany’s support in 
protecting the sector that Portugal cares about.13 The special interests in Germany are better off 
with the high tariffs on each sector than with low tariffs on both products. The special interests in 
the logrolling partner Portugal are similarly better off with the combined high tariffs.  
The outcome under logrolling, then, will be different than if logrolling had not taken 
place. More specifically, once the different intensities of preferences are taken into account, the 
observed common external tariff will be different, and thus reflect the preferences of a different 
pivotal government than if logrolling had not taken place. If the decision rule is simple 
majority,14 the outcome under logrolling will reflect the preferences of a more protectionist 
country than the median, such as the one at the 60th percentile of the distribution. This is because 
the observed tariff rate will be higher than if there were no vote trading, meaning either that a 
decrease in tariff was blocked or that the tariff decreased by less than it would have otherwise. 
The same is true under qualified majority. With logrolling, the decisive national government will 
now be the one whose tariff preferences lie at a higher percentile than the 71st, such as the 86th 
percentile.15  
The estimated equation, then, is given by 
! 
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it
       (3) 
                                                
13 Note that given how decisions are made in the EU, France could also vote for a higher tariff in the sector Germany 
cares about in exchange for a vote for increased agricultural subsidies, for instance. 
14 When voting for the common external tariff, simple majority is not allowed. It is included here, however, as a 
reference and as a check on the results. 
15 The 86th percentile is used because it lies between the 71st and the 100th percentile that is implied by unanimity. 
Given that the number of member states included in the analysis varies from 5 to 11, the choice of the 86th percentile 
also allows me to capture the national government whose preference lies between the 71st and the 100th percentiles 
(the same is true for the 60th percentile). 
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where 
! 
t
it
 is the common external tariff for industry i at time t; C
it
d is the vector of the decisive 
country d’s characteristics for industry i and time t; U
t
is a dummy indicating the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round (equal to 1 starting in 1993); !
i
 is the industry-specific fixed effect, which is 
included to account for any time-invariant unobserved factors; and !
it
 is the error term. In other 
words, the observed common external tariff will reflect the political-economy characteristics of 
the decisive national government. One equation is estimated for each decision rule. As in Romer 
and Rosenthal (1982), the criterion for selecting which model best describes tariffs is the R-
squared. A specification where the decisive country is the one preferring the lowest tariff is also 
included to ensure the credibility of the results, as it would suggest that proposals were to 
increase the tariff, which is unlikely given GATT commitments. Finally, two specifications of 
(3) are estimated to take into account the possibility that national government’s preferences may 
be weighted equally or differently according to the number of votes a country has in the Council 
(Table 2).16 
 
2.2 Pan-European Lobbying 
The 1987 SEA, and the subsequent adoption of the Single Market in 1993 suggest that 
the EU may have moved towards deeper integration, where the customs union trade policy is 
determined by a pan-European agency, which in turn is subject to influence by pan-European 
lobbies (Cadot et al. 1999). This suggests a model that considers the EU as a single national 
government, rather than a confederation of countries. In other words, firms are now lobbying 
directly to affect the common external tariff, rather than the preferences of their national 
                                                
16 Votes in the Council are weighted. The unweighted alternative is included, however, to account for the fact that it 
is the European Commission that drafts proposals and negotiates treaties. It also serves as a check to see whether 
decisions are made at the Council or at the Commission-level. 
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governments. This is analogous to a single country, like the U.S., setting its own trade policy. 
Firms in the U.S. must lobby legislators in Washington, rather than in their state capitals. In the 
case of the EU, firms are now lobbying in Brussels, rather than their national capitals. And rather 
than each member states selecting the preferred tariff rate that will maximize political support, it 
is the European Commission that will choose the tariff rate that results in an politically-optimal 
deviation from free trade. The solution to the maximization problem, then, is the EU’s observed 
common external tariff. And since each country is now taken to be analogous to a state in the 
U.S., their preference-determining industry characteristics are aggregated across the EU. In 
particular, the industry characteristics are summed across countries. In other words, the number 
of firms in the textile industry in Portugal, for instance, will be added to the number of firms in 
France, Italy, Greece, and so forth, so that the estimated equation is 
! 
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       (4) 
where 
! 
C
it
EU  is the vector of EU characteristics for industry i at time t. In the weighted 
specification, characteristics are aggregated using the votes in the Council of Ministers as 
weights. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Tariffs 
Tariffs for 1958 were taken from Tariffs and Trade in Western Europe, and needed to be 
converted from the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) into the 3-digit industry classification. 
The sample includes data for 80 industries and seven member countries.17  
                                                
17 The countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and the UK. 
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Tariff rates for 1987-05 were obtained from various issues of the Official Journal of the 
European Communities, which publishes the common tariff schedule annually. In general, these 
duties enter into force on January 1 of the following year. The data were collected for the 
publication year, rather than the years when the tariffs entered into force.18 
Import duties are expressed in three ways: as ad valorem tariffs equal to a percentage of 
the product’s value; as specific tariffs per unit weight, volume, or number of pieces; or as a 
combination of the two. In all cases, tariffs are based on the CIF value (cost, insurance, freight). 
Duties are expressed as conventional duties,19 and only the ad valorem duties are used. In some 
instances, the duties were expressed as a combination of ad valorem and specific tariffs. As a 
result, the 10 affected industries were dropped from the sample.20 Data were collected for every 
other year, beginning with 1987. Details on assembly are provided in the Appendix. 
 
3.2 Industry and Trade 
Data for the period were taken from Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics, which was 
taken from the Eurostat website. Again, since data were not available at the 4-digit level for the 
period before 1995 and because of the high frequency of missing data, it was decided to use the 
3-digit level of NACE Rev. 1 for the purposes of this paper.  
 Data on exports and imports come from Eurostat’s Intra- and Extra-EU trade (Combined 
Nomenclature), Supplement 2, as well as the Comext database available from Eurostat’s website.  
 
                                                
18 This is because the publication year is the one that would reflect lobbying influence. 
19 Conventional duties are duties that are applicable to imported goods originating in countries which are contracting 
parties to the GATT, or with which the EC has concluded agreements containing the most-favored nation tariff. 
20 Including those industries by using only the ad valorem part of the tariff rate does not change the results. 
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4. Results 
Results are shown in Table 3 for the unweighted specification, and Table 4 for the 
weighted specification. All regressions include a full set of industry-specific fixed effects.  
Standard errors are both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent.   
Results support the deep integration hypothesis, since in all cases, the sum specification 
has a better fit than the other voting models, as indicated by the within R-squared. This suggests 
that the model that best describes how the common external tariff is set is one that aggregates 
each national government’s preference-determining industry characteristics. Furthermore, most 
of the industry characteristics used to explain the common tariff under this specification are 
significant and exhibit the expected sign. In particular, the number of firms, the labor cost share, 
the intra-industry index, the export share, and the Uruguay Round dummy are all significant and 
have the predicted relationships to the common external tariff.  
These results then suggest that the U.S.-type specification, where industry characteristics 
are aggregated, does fit better than the decisive country specification, meaning a model 
accounting for deeper integration, rather than the shallow integration model, is the one that best 
explains how the common external tariff has been determined in the EU since the veto power 
was suspended in 1987.  
 
5. Sensitivity Analysis 
Comparing models on the basis of their R-squared is not the only way of deciding which 
one best explains the variable of interest. Because the estimated equations are OLS regressions, 
and each estimated equation contains the same number of regressors and the dependent variable 
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is the same, the R-squared is an appropriate measure for comparing the different models.21 To 
further test the robustness of the results, though, J-tests of the deep integration versus the shallow 
integration specifications are performed. In particular, the deep integration hypothesis is tested 
against both unanimity outcomes, as well as the median, and the qualified-majority rule and the 
two logrolling possibilities arising when proposals are to lower tariffs. These were chosen 
because they were the best performing models. 
The J-test, as proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981), is a procedure for choosing 
between non-nested models. The J-test, then, can be used to see if the model that had the highest 
R-squared does in fact have a greater explanatory power than the alternatives, but it has the 
disadvantage that oftentimes it is impossible to make a selection between models. In particular, 
in a finite sample, the test of the H0 versus H1 can lead to four possibilities: reject both, neither,  
or either one of the two hypothesis (Greene 1997). Another disadvantage is that it is a weak test, 
and hence one cannot obtain a ranking of models, as one does with the R-squared.  
The results, shown in Table 5, indicate that this is partially the case. The deep integration 
model reject all the possible decisive-country models in all cases; however, the decisive national 
government models also mostly reject the deep integration model. Still, additional support for the 
sum specification is provided by the fact that the t-statistic is always higher when deep 
integration is the alternative hypothesis than when it is the null.  
Another potential source of concern is the fact that some of the variables used as 
indicators of political influence present a potential endogeneity problem. Specifically, import 
penetration is affected by tariff rates. The higher the tariffs, the less will domestic consumers buy 
of imported goods, resulting in a decrease in imports altogether. It would be desirable to consider 
the joint determination of import penetration levels with tariff protection and perform a 
                                                
21 Using the Akaike Information Criterion, or the Schwarz Criterion will lead to the same conclusion in this case. 
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simultaneous estimation of the two equations, as in Trefler (1993). Due to data restrictions, 
however, such an approach is not possible.22 The first column in Tables 6 and 7, however, 
presents the results of running the same regressions as before, only this time without the import 
penetration and the change in import penetration. Presumably, if these two variables are 
endogenous, they would bias the results and potentially alter the conclusion drawn. What is 
found is that the results are unchanged in that the deep integration specification still performs 
best.  
Another problem that has been pointed out repeatedly in the literature concerns the use of 
import shares as weights when aggregating tariffs to the industry level. As a result, this paper 
uses a simple rather than a weighted average, but to ensure that this choice did not affect the 
results, regressions were run using the import shares as weights. As indicated in the second 
column of Tables 6 and 7, the model in which national governments’ industry characteristics are 
summed still has the highest R-squared, suggesting that the results are robust to the choice of a 
weighting scheme. 
Another concern that might arise regards the way the tariff rates were constructed for 
each industry and year. Because in some instances there were many CN categories making up 
one 3-digit industry, and because of changing customs classification, it was decided to include 
only the CN categories that made up a significant share of trade in that industry. To test whether 
this choice influenced the results, the regressions were run where the dependent variable was 
constructed from all CN categories making up an industry. As column 3 in Tables 6 and 7 
indicate, the results were robust to how the dependent variable was constructed. 
                                                
22 Trefler estimates a simultaneous equation Tobit model, with one equation having non-tariff barriers as the 
dependent variable and the other having import penetration. The explanatory variables used in the import 
penetration equation are measures of factor endowments, which are not available for the EU and for the period in 
question. 
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Now, since the industry data for the period before 1995 required a correction,23 it is 
possible that these results might be subject to measurement error. To investigate this, the sample 
was restricted to 1995-2005, the period for which data on all firms is available. The results are 
shown in column 4 of Tables 6 and 7. Once again, the aggregated specifications had the best fit.  
Another issue that could be of concern regards the use of a Uruguay Round dummy 
instead of time fixed-effects. To investigate whether this choice affected the results obtained, 
year fixed effects were included in place of the Uruguay Round dummy. As shown on column 5 
in Tables 6 and 7, this choice had no impact on the results. 
Finally, columns 6 and 7 of Tables 6 and 7 present the results of regressions using 
different functional forms. In column 6, none of the variables are in logs; whereas in column 7, 
only the dependent variable is not in logs. The conclusions drawn are insensitive to this change 
in functional form, with the sum specification being preferred. 
These tests then confirm that the specification that best explains the common European 
external tariff following the 1987 SEA is tge one which reflects deeper integration. 
 
5.1. Revisiting the Decisive Country 
Still another possible concern that might be raised consists of how the decisive country is 
determined in the first place. In particular, an assumption was made that the function that 
determines tariff rates in 1958 is unchanged over time. To ensure that the results are not affected 
by this assumption, two additional methods are used to identify the decisive country. 
In the first case, as in Romer and Rosenthal (1982), the industry characteristics included 
are those lying at the relevant percentile. For example, if the voting rule is qualified-majority, the 
                                                
23 As mentioned previously, industry data referred to firms employing 20 or more persons while the trade data were 
for all firms. 
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decisive country is the one whose industry characteristics lie at the 71st percentile. The percentile 
used can be ascending or descending, depending on the sign prediction. From section 2, it was 
predicted that the share of employment in the country, the labor intensity, the import penetration 
and the change in import penetration were all positively related to the tariff rates; whereas the 
number of firms and the export intensity were anticipated to exhibit a negative relationship. For 
those with the positive relation, the percentile is, for example, the 60th; but for those showing a 
negative relationship, the appropriate percentile is the 40th rather than the 60th. Results are shown 
in Tables 8 and 9 for the unweighted and weighted specification, respectively. They indicate that 
the deep integration hypothesis still has the best fit.  
This methodology, however, has a drawback. If one were to count the number of times 
that a country’s industry characteristics matched the appropriate percentile in the distribution, 
and do it for every industry characteristic, one will most likely find an inconsistent decisive 
country. For example, it is possible that according to this methodology, the decisive country 
according to the share of employment is Italy, while France was the decisive country in the 
number of firms and wage rate, Germany in labor intensity and import penetration, and Belgium 
in the change in import penetration and export intensity. This, then, results in an inconsistent 
result, in that there are four potential decisive countries. To circumvent this problem, simple 
bivariate OLS regressions are run to determine which of the industry characteristics were the 
most influential in affecting tariffs. The decisive country is then the one whose most influential 
characteristic lies at the relevant percentile. The results for both the unweighted and the vote-
weighted cases are shown in Tables 10 and 11. Again, the deep integration hypothesis is favored. 
These results then provide further support for the finding that from 1987 to 2005, a model 
reflecting deep integration best explains how tariffs were determined in the European Union. 
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6. Conclusion 
Since the 1987 Single European Act, the European Union has moved towards deeper 
political and economic integration. This paper used a unique dataset to empirically test the 
hypothesis that since 1987, the EU has behaved like a single unified country in collective 
decision-making regarding the union’s common external tariff. In particular, it developed a 
framework for examining how the common external tariff is set in the European Union. Under 
the hypothesis of shallow integration, an individual country would be decisive in the tariff 
determination process (as in a decisive-voter model). The empirical specification in that case 
consisted of regressing the preference-determining characteristics of the decisive national 
government (for each decision rule) against the common external tariff level for 80 
manufacturing industries over the 1987-2005 period.  
Under deeper integration, however, national governments’ tariff preferences would be 
aggregated in some fashion, so that the collective decision-making process would resemble tariff 
determination in a single national government, such as the U.S. Empirically, the preference-
determining characteristics of the EU were regressed against the common external tariff, with the 
EU characteristics being calculated as the sum or average of all member governments’ 
preference-determining characteristics. 
Empirical results confirm evidence suggesting a drift to Brussels, as the EU-specification 
performed better than any of the decisive national government voting models. The data also 
implied that changes in the European common tariff during the 1987-2005 period were best 
explained by the number of firms, the labor cost share, the intra-industry trade index, the export 
share, and the Uruguay Round dummy. These results were robust to eliminating potentially 
endogenous variables; using import-weighted rather than a simple average of the tariff rates; 
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changing how the dependent variable was constructed; restricting the sample period; including 
time fixed-effects instead of a Uruguay Round dummy; changing the functional form; and using 
different methods for finding the decisive country. As demonstrated in Tavares (2006), this 
finding is reversed if one examines the period preceding the 1987 Single European Act. Because 
countries were allowed to veto during that period, it was found that the EC was behaving like a 
collection of countries, meaning that the common tariff reflected the preferences of a decisive 
national government. This paper then suggests that the suspension of the veto in 1987 has moved 
the EU from a confederation of countries to resembling a single country in setting the common 
tariff. 
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8. Appendix—Dataset Construction 
8.1. Tariffs 
The tariff rates provided needed to be converted to the 3-digit level of NACE Rev. 1,24 
which is a 4-digit classification that was drawn up in 1990 that was designed to be a more 
detailed version of ISIC Rev. 3. A correspondence table between NACE Rev. 1 and CN was 
obtained from the EU’s RAMON nomenclatures server.25 Because data at the 4-digit level was 
only available starting in 1995, and even then, the coverage was sparse, it was decided to use the 
3-digit level. 
Some of the NACE Rev. 1 categories corresponded to only one CN, but in most cases, 
there were several CN that made up one 3-digit NACE Rev. 1 industry.26 Rather than averaging 
all the corresponding tariff rates, which would have made it difficult to accurately reflect the size  
of changes in the level of protection, it was decided to calculate the share of trade in 1988 
represented by each CN category within an industry. All products that accounted for at least 10 
percent of the trade in an industry were used in representing the tariff for that industry. For some 
industries, no product met that threshold, or all the products meeting that threshold, taken 
together, did not account for at least 50 percent of the trade. In those cases, all the products with 
the highest trade percentage which, when added up, met the 50 percent threshold, were used. The 
tariff rate for the industry was taken then to be the simple average of all relevant duties in that 
industry.27 
                                                
24 General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities within the European Communities. 
25 http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/ 
26 An additional problem is that the customs classification itself is not constant. 
27 The tariff rates could also be aggregated using the import share as weight. However, because the customs 
classification is not constant, it becomes difficult to assign the weight to a CN category that splits into multiple 
categories, especially since in some of these cases, the categories it split into are common with other CN categories. 
Furthermore, using import shares as weights when aggregating tariffs to the industry level can potentially cause a 
low weight to be attached to products that face high tariffs, since those goods are likely to have low imports for 
reasons stated above. Lee and Swagel (1995) construct average tariffs using import and production shares as 
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In 1997 and 1999, conventional duties for Chapters 1-24 were split into two periods, 
January 1-June 30 and July 1-December 31. For these cases, the tariffs were averaged to reflect 
the tariff for that particular year and good. 
 
8.2. Industry and Trade 
Because the industry data contained Even at the 3-digit level, the data contained missing 
observations. As a result, data were collected for every year, rather than every other year. In 
cases where the previous and following year’s figures were available, they were used to linearly 
interpolate the values. This was not always possible, since there were instances where only the 
previous year’s or the following year’s was available (but not both). In those cases, the data from 
the closest year were used to fill in what was missing. A criterion was also established to 
determine whether an industry should be kept or dropped for lack of data. As long as there were 
at least six out of the total possible 13 countries available,28 and sufficient years for interpolation 
to be used; and as long as there were both industry and trade data available, the industry was 
kept. In the end, out of 120 industries, 80 industries were included in the sample over seven years 
(every other year from 1987-99), for a total of 960 observations. 
Another complication arose from the fact that data before 1995 refers to enterprises 
employing 20 or more persons for all countries except Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Data on 
firms employing less than 20 persons are available starting in 1995, though not for all country-
industry pairs. In order to adjust the data to include small firms, for each variable, the proportion 
represented by the small firms was calculated. For instance, in the case of production, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
weights. Production shares, however, tend to overstate protection, much in the same way that import shares 
understate them. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to create an import-weighted tariff to test the robustness of the 
results.  
28 Data for Belgium and Portugal are not available at all for one of the explanatory variables included in the analysis.  
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production share of small firms in total production was calculated for the available years. These 
shares did not change much from one year to the next, so the average ratio represented by small 
firms in the years after 1995 was used to calculate the values for all firms in the preceding years. 
Data on exports and imports come from Eurostat’s Intra- and Extra-EU trade (Combined 
Nomenclature), Supplement 2. The data were aggregated from the 8-digit CN into the 3-digit 
NACE Rev. 1, as was the case with the tariff. 
Another issue was that trade data for Luxembourg referred to both Belgium and 
Luxembourg. To separate Luxembourg’s share, the share of population in Luxembourg was used 
to adjust the data. 
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Table 1. Determining Preferred Tariff Rates 
Dependent variable: ln(1+ common external 
tariff) (simple average) 
Employment Share -0.210*** 
 
 
(0.062) 
# Firms -0.016 
 
 
(0.027) 
Wage -0.562*** 
 
 
(0.101) 
Labor Cost Share -0.094 
 
 
(0.231) 
Intra-industry Ratio 0.134** 
 
 
(0.064) 
Import Penetration -0.124 
 
 
(0.080) 
Export Share -0.152** 
 
 
(0.075) 
Obs 449 
Adj R-squared 0.6092 
F-statistic 15.19 
Log-likelihood -342.98 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 7 countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the 
UK) and 80 industries. Industry and trade data are from 1963 and 1976, while the tariff is from 1958. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are significant at the 1-
percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are significant at the 10-
percent level. All variables are in logs. The estimated equations also include a full set of industry dummies, as well 
as a constant. The relationship between the 1958 country-specific tariffs and the industry characteristics were used to 
forecast each national government’s preferred tariff rates over the 1987-2005. 
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Table 2. Distribution of Votes in Council of Ministers 
 
Country 
Votes 
1973-2004 
 
Country 
Votes 
2004-present 
Austria, Sweden 
 
4 Austria, Sweden 
 
10 
Belgium, Netherlands 
 
5 Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal 
 
12 
Denmark, Ireland, Finland 
 
3 Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Lithuania, Slovakia 
 
7 
France, Germany, Italy, UK 
 
10 France, Germany, Italy, UK 
 
29 
Greece, Portugal 
 
5 Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slovenia 
 
4 
Luxembourg 
 
2 Spain, Poland 
 
27 
Spain, Portugal 
 
8 Malta 3 
Source: European Communities (1999), http://www.consillium.europa.eu/  
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Table 3. Unweighted Regressions Explaining Common External Tariff 
 Unanimity 
1 
Median Logrolling 
1 
QMV Logrolling 
2 
Unanimity  Sum 
Employment  -0.039 -0.011 0.040 0.024 0.031 0.012 -0.082 
Share 
 
(0.040) (0.038) (0.032) (0.033) (0.029) (0.035) (0.148) 
# Firms -0.045*** -0.011 -0.001 0.004 -0.043*** -0.026* -0.201*** 
 
 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.044) 
Wage 0.147** 0.143** 0.175*** 0.132** 0.182*** 0.104** 0.097 
 
 
(0.066) (0.073) (0.066) (0.056) (0.048) (0.046) (0.129) 
Labor Cost  0.443*** 0.073 0.107* 0.146*** 0.090 0.153** 0.902*** 
Share 
 
(0.082) (0.061) (0.063) (0.047) (0.060) (0.065) (0.216) 
Intra-industry -0.093*** 0.046* -0.013 -0.011 -0.042** 0.006 -0.132* 
Ratio 
 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.074) 
Import  -0.001 -0.014 -0.057** 0.049** 0.044 0.113*** -0.067 
Penetration 
 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.034) (0.074) 
∆ Import  -0.001** -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.003 
Penetration 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Export Share -0.069** -0.078** -0.060** -0.112*** -0.088*** -0.146*** -0.186** 
 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.078) 
Uruguay  -0.321*** -0.357*** -0.360*** -0.349*** -0.309*** -0.358*** -0.076** 
Round 
 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.037) 
Obs 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
R-squared (within) 0.3520 0.2849 0.3048 0.3119 0.3472 0.3242 0.4536 
Adj R-squared 0.2709 0.1954 0.2178 0.2258 0.2655 0.2396 0.3852 
F-statistic 31.8616 28.8099 32.4480 35.1953 37.6011 32.6121 52.8040 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 80 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1987-2005). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Uruguay Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1993). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across 
country, is included as alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Preferred tariff rates for each 
national government were forecasted over the 1987-2005 period using the results from a regression of 1958 country-
specific tariffs against industry and trade characteristics (see Table 1). 
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Table 4. Weighted Regressions Explaining Common External Tariff  
 Unanimity 
1 
Median Logrolling 
1 
QMV Logrolling 
2 
Unanimity  Sum 
Employment  -0.039 0.051 0.105*** 0.222*** 0.067** 0.012 -0.024 
Share 
 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.155) 
# Firms -0.045*** -0.029** -0.020 -0.037*** -0.069*** -0.026* -0.126*** 
 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.033) 
Wage 0.147** 0.164** 0.302*** 0.485*** 0.215*** 0.104** 0.086 
 
 
(0.066) (0.081) (0.080) (0.064) (0.061) (0.046) (0.134) 
Labor Cost  0.443*** 0.063 0.150*** 0.079 0.215*** 0.153** 0.975*** 
Share 
 
(0.082) (0.067) (0.057) (0.058) (0.070) (0.065) (0.215) 
Intra-industry -0.093*** -0.021 -0.003 -0.044** -0.038 0.006 -0.157** 
Ratio 
 
(0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.073) 
Import  -0.001 0.032 0.005 0.017 0.065** 0.113*** -0.035 
Penetration 
 
(0.030) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.034) (0.075) 
∆ Import  -0.001** -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.004 
Penetration 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Export Share -0.069** -0.102*** -0.040 0.003 -0.082** -0.146*** -0.159* 
 
 
(0.032) (0.037) (0.033) (0.025) (0.034) (0.027) (0.086) 
Uruguay  -0.321*** -0.361*** -0.347*** -0.261*** -0.279*** -0.358*** -0.121*** 
Round 
 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) 
Obs 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
R-squared (within) 0.3520 0.2817 0.2978 0.3654 0.3618 0.3242 0.4372 
Adj R-squared 0.2709 0.1918 0.2099 0.2860 0.2819 0.2396 0.3667 
F-statistic 31.8616 28.0581 34.0574 34.5673 41.0181 32.6121 45.8569 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 80 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1987-2005). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Uruguay Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1993). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across 
country, is included as alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Preferred tariff rates for each 
national government were forecasted over the 1987-2005 period using the results from a regression of 1958 country-
specific tariffs against industry and trade characteristics (see Table 1). All regressions are weighted by the number of 
votes each country has in the Council of Ministers. 
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Table 5. J-Tests 
  Unweighted Weighted 
Null Alternative t-stat Conclusion t-stat Conclusion 
Unanimity 1 Sum 12.04*** Reject 11.11*** Reject 
Sum 
 
Unanimity 1 5.19*** Reject 5.37*** Reject 
Median Sum 12.24*** Reject 12.32*** Reject 
Sum 
 
Median 0.60 Cannot Reject 0.70 Cannot Reject 
Logrolling 1 Sum 11.08*** Reject 10.53*** Reject 
Sum 
 
Logrolling 1 1.91* Reject 0.54 Cannot Reject 
QMV Sum 12.15*** Reject 9.76*** Reject 
Sum 
 
QMV 3.14*** Reject 4.99*** Reject 
Logrolling 2 Sum 11.39*** Reject 9.96*** Reject 
Sum 
 
Logrolling 2 4.12*** Reject 4.54*** Reject 
Unanimity 2 Sum 12.27*** Reject 11.52*** Reject 
Sum 
 
Unanimity 2 3.31*** Reject 3.32*** Reject 
Note: * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at the 1 percent level. 
Estimates marked *** are significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; 
and those marked * are significant at the 10-percent level. Unanimity 1 refers to the model testing unanimity (in 
which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the assumption that the status 
quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the qualified-majority voting 
requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test possible logrolling outcomes 
(60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is the one preferring the 
highest tariff. The sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across country, is included as 
alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Preferred tariff rates for each national government were 
forecasted over the 1987-2005 period using the results from a regression of 1958 country-specific tariffs against 
industry and trade characteristics (see Table 1). All regressions are weighted by the number of votes each country 
has in the Council of Ministers. 
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Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis—Unweighted Specification 
Hypothesis Decision 
Rule 
Import 
Pen 
Tariff 
weight 
All 
Tariffs 95-05 
Time 
FE's 
Linear Lin Log 
Shallow 
Integration 
Unanimity 1 
 
0.3461 0.3480 0.4449 0.1695 0.5377 0.3946 0.4100 
 Median 
 
0.2844 0.2956 0.3543 0.0896 0.5189 0.3602 0.3630 
 Logrolling 1 
 
0.3003 0.2865 0.3745 0.0957 0.5134 0.3373 0.3578 
 QMV 
 
0.3078 0.3235 0.3703 0.0922 0.5436 0.3577 0.3757 
 Logrolling 2 
 
0.3444 0.3496 0.4266 0.1193 0.5490 0.3813 0.4009 
 Unanimity 2 
 
0.3101 0.3319 0.3739 0.1028 0.5388 0.3873 0.3839 
Deep 
Integration 
EU-Wide 
 
0.4517 0.4488 0.5718 0.2940 0.5324 0.5419 0.5300 
 Obs. 800 800 800 480 800 800 800 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 80 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1987-2005). Columns refer 
to different sensitivity tests, while each row corresponds to a voting model. Each cell refers to the within R-squared 
for a particular model and specification. Unanimity 1 refers to the model testing unanimity (in which the decisive 
national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the assumption that the status quo is lower than 
proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to 
the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, 
respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is the one preferring the highest tariff. The sum 
regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across country, is included as alternatives to the decisive 
national government framework.  Preferred tariff rates for each national government were forecasted over the 1987-
2005 period using the results from a regression of 1958 country-specific tariffs against industry and trade 
characteristics (see Table 1). The sensitivity tests are as follows: import pen. refers to a specification without the 
import penetration and the change in import penetration, which are potentially endogenous; tariff weight refers to 
having the import-weighted common tariff, rather than the simple average, as the dependent variable; all tariffs 
denotes that the dependent variable is constructed by taking the simple average of all products making up one 
industry; 95-99 indicates that the sample was constrained to the 1995-99 period; time FE’s indicates that time fixed-
effects were included instead of a Uruguay Round dummy; linear refers to a specification in which neither 
dependent nor independent variables are in logs, while lin-log is a specification where only the independent 
variables are in logs. 
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Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis—Weighted Specification 
Hypothesis Decision 
Rule 
Import 
Pen 
Tariff 
weight 
All 
Tariffs 95-05 
Time 
FE's 
Linear Lin Log 
Shallow 
Integration 
Unanimity 1 
 
0.3461 0.3480 0.4449 0.1695 0.5377 0.3946 0.4100 
 Median 
 
0.2807 0.2839 0.3503 0.0843 0.5256 0.3367 0.3516 
 Logrolling 1 
 
0.2976 0.2978 0.3709 0.1124 0.5118 0.3364 0.3824 
 QMV 
 
0.3625 0.3759 0.4449 0.1214 0.5293 0.3777 0.4082 
 Logrolling 2 
 
0.3569 0.3538 0.4426 0.1093 0.5524 0.4166 0.4119 
 Unanimity 2 
 
0.3101 0.3319 0.3739 0.1028 0.5388 0.3873 0.3839 
Deep 
Integration 
EU-Wide 
 
0.4353 0.4301 0.5504 0.2632 0.5261 0.5317 0.5083 
 Obs. 800 800 800 480 800 800 800 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 80 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1987-2005). Columns refer 
to different sensitivity tests, while each row corresponds to a voting model. Each cell refers to the within R-squared 
for a particular model and specification. Unanimity 1 refers to the model testing unanimity (in which the decisive 
national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the assumption that the status quo is lower than 
proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to 
the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, 
respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is the one preferring the highest tariff. The sum 
regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across country, is included as alternatives to the decisive 
national government framework.  Preferred tariff rates for each national government were forecasted over the 1987-
2005 period using the results from a regression of 1958 country-specific tariffs against industry and trade 
characteristics (see Table 1). The sensitivity tests are as follows: import pen. refers to a specification without the 
import penetration and the change in import penetration, which are potentially endogenous; tariff weight refers to 
having the import-weighted common tariff, rather than the simple average, as the dependent variable; all tariffs 
denotes that the dependent variable is constructed by taking the simple average of all products making up one 
industry; 95-99 indicates that the sample was constrained to the 1995-99 period; time FE’s indicates that time fixed-
effects were included instead of a Uruguay Round dummy; linear refers to a specification in which neither 
dependent nor independent variables are in logs, while lin-log is a specification where only the independent 
variables are in logs. All regressions are weighted by the number of votes each country has in the Council of 
Ministers. 
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Table 8: Testing Voting Rules—Decisive Country from Industry Characteristics 
 Unanimity 1 Median Logrolling 1 QMV Logrolling 2 Unanimity 2 Sum 
Employment  -0.083** -0.178** -0.161*** -0.081 -0.164** -0.174*** -0.082 
Share 
 
(0.041) (0.069) (0.061) (0.066) (0.068) (0.054) (0.148) 
# Firms -0.175*** -0.100** -0.133*** -0.140*** -0.143*** -0.168*** -0.201*** 
 
 
(0.032) (0.043) (0.032) (0.027) (0.026) (0.036) (0.044) 
Wage 0.382*** 0.324*** 0.160** 0.126** 0.104** 0.101** 0.097 
 
 
(0.085) (0.087) (0.072) (0.057) (0.047) (0.046) (0.129) 
Labor Cost  0.279*** 0.634*** 0.694*** 0.631*** 0.578*** 0.414*** 0.902*** 
Share 
 
(0.074) (0.162) (0.173) (0.153) (0.110) (0.088) (0.216) 
Intra-industry -0.142 -0.132** -0.131*** -0.127*** 0.049 -0.045* -0.132* 
Ratio 
 
(0.103) (0.059) (0.050) (0.039) (0.031) (0.024) (0.074) 
Import  0.070* -0.029 -0.089* -0.133*** -0.213*** -0.121*** -0.067 
Penetration 
 
(0.038) (0.053) (0.052) (0.043) (0.041) (0.031) (0.074) 
∆ Import  -0.001* -0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.003** 0.000 0.003 
Penetration 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Export Share -0.108*** -0.317*** -0.309*** -0.250*** -0.165*** -0.173*** -0.186** 
 
 
(0.031) (0.057) (0.053) (0.046) (0.033) (0.036) (0.078) 
Uruguay  -0.185*** -0.215*** -0.196*** -0.178*** -0.226*** -0.256*** -0.076** 
Round 
 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.037) 
Obs 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
R-squared (within) 0.4046 0.4091 0.4151 0.4096 0.4153 0.4110 0.4536 
Adj R-squared 0.3301 0.3351 0.3419 0.3357 0.3422 0.3372 0.3852 
F-statistic 39.3013 39.1967 40.3265 41.2193 40.5260 42.9090 52.8040 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 80 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1987-2005). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Uruguay Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1993). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across 
country, is included as alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Regressions are based on data 
for the country or countries whose industry characteristics lie at the relevant percentile. 
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Table 9: Testing Voting Rules—Decisive Country from Industry Characteristics, Weighted 
Specification 
 Unanimity 
1 
Median Logrolling 
1 
QMV Logrolling 
2 
Unanimity  Sum 
Employment  -0.083** -0.100 -0.111 0.085 -0.049 -0.174*** -0.082 
Share 
 
(0.041) (0.084) (0.068) (0.073) (0.063) (0.054) (0.148) 
# Firms -0.175*** -0.215*** -0.176*** -0.075* -0.156*** -0.168*** -0.201*** 
 
 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.038) (0.039) (0.028) (0.036) (0.044) 
Wage 0.382*** 0.244** 0.112 0.377*** 0.103** 0.101** 0.097 
 
 
(0.085) (0.103) (0.092) (0.089) (0.048) (0.046) (0.129) 
Labor Cost  0.279*** 0.556*** 0.829*** 0.677*** 0.913*** 0.414*** 0.902*** 
Share 
 
(0.074) (0.148) (0.170) (0.156) (0.143) (0.088) (0.216) 
Intra-industry -0.142 -0.173*** -0.110* -0.149*** -0.009 -0.045* -0.132* 
Ratio 
 
(0.103) (0.063) (0.057) (0.045) (0.034) (0.024) (0.074) 
Import  0.070* 0.005 -0.108** -0.058 -0.160*** -0.121*** -0.067 
Penetration 
 
(0.038) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.044) (0.031) (0.074) 
∆ Import  -0.001* 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003** 0.000 0.003 
Penetration 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Export Share -0.108*** -0.330*** -0.273*** -0.283*** -0.199*** -0.173*** -0.186** 
 
 
(0.031) (0.064) (0.061) (0.059) (0.047) (0.036) (0.078) 
Uruguay  -0.185*** -0.193*** -0.194*** -0.168*** -0.184*** -0.256*** -0.076** 
Round 
 
(0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.037) 
Obs 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
R-squared (within) 0.4046 0.4260 0.4037 0.4111 0.4384 0.4110 0.4536 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3301 0.3541 0.3291 0.3374 0.3681 0.3372 0.3852 
F-statistic 39.3013 38.7378 37.8075 38.6537 41.3277 42.9090 52.8040 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 80 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1987-2005). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Uruguay Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1993). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across 
country, is included as alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Regressions are based on data 
for the country or countries whose industry characteristics lie at the relevant percentile. All regressions are weighted 
by the number of votes each country has in the Council of Ministers. 
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Table 10: Testing Voting Rules—Decisive Country from Most Influential Characteristic 
 Unanimity 
1 
Median Logrolling 
1 
QMV Logrolling 
2 
Unanimity  Sum 
Employment  0.103*** -0.028 -0.014 -0.006 -0.016 0.001 -0.082 
Share 
 
(0.037) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.029) (0.148) 
# Firms -0.194*** -0.014 -0.023** -0.014 -0.024** -0.082*** -0.201*** 
 
 
(0.036) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.044) 
Wage 0.139** 0.081*** 0.092*** 0.009 0.021 0.000 0.097 
 
 
(0.064) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.027) (0.036) (0.129) 
Labor Cost  0.124 0.063 0.129** 0.034 0.122** 0.246*** 0.902*** 
Share 
 
(0.078) (0.056) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.077) (0.216) 
Intra-industry -0.037 -0.009 -0.014 0.022 0.045** -0.036 -0.132* 
Ratio 
 
(0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.074) 
Import  -0.030 0.044* -0.020 0.025 0.003 -0.128*** -0.067 
Penetration 
 
(0.042) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.074) 
∆ Import  -0.002 -0.000 0.003** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 
Penetration 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) 
Export Share -0.078* -0.449*** -0.366*** -0.370*** -0.290*** -0.039 -0.186** 
 
 
(0.042) (0.058) (0.051) (0.048) (0.042) (0.026) (0.078) 
Uruguay  -0.146*** -0.244*** -0.256*** -0.268*** -0.289*** -0.272*** -0.076** 
Round 
 
(0.041) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.037) 
Obs 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
R-squared (within) 0.3625 0.3702 0.3767 0.3365 0.3251 0.3586 0.4536 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2827 0.2913 0.2987 0.2534 0.2406 0.2783 0.3852 
F-statistic 38.8546 31.4550 35.6660 33.0594 33.5466 39.2276 52.8040 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 80 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1987-2005). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Uruguay Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1993). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across 
country, is included as alternatives to the decisive national government framework.  Regressions are based on data 
for the country whose most influential characteristic, lies at the relevant percentile. 
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Table 11: Testing Voting Rules—Decisive Country from Most Influential Characteristic, 
Weighted Specification 
 Unanimity 
1 
Median Logrolling 
1 
QMV Logrolling 
2 
Unanimity  Sum 
Employment  0.103*** 0.025 -0.008 0.020 0.005 -0.027 -0.024 
Share 
 
(0.037) (0.024) (0.021) (0.028) (0.033) (0.025) (0.155) 
# Firms -0.194*** -0.034** -0.037*** -0.023* -0.022 -0.007 -0.126*** 
 
 
(0.036) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.033) 
Wage 0.139** 0.098** 0.079** 0.069* 0.127*** 0.048 0.086 
 
 
(0.064) (0.039) (0.031) (0.039) (0.044) (0.034) (0.134) 
Labor Cost  0.124 0.096 0.186*** 0.030 1.085*** 0.065 0.975*** 
Share 
 
(0.078) (0.059) (0.058) (0.064) (0.151) (0.057) (0.215) 
Intra-industry -0.037 -0.049* -0.017 -0.026 -0.058* 0.001 -0.157** 
Ratio 
 
(0.034) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.021) (0.073) 
Import  -0.030 -0.039 0.014 0.041 -0.053 -0.050* -0.035 
Penetration 
 
(0.042) (0.030) (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) (0.029) (0.075) 
∆ Import  -0.002 0.005** 0.001 -0.005** 0.001 -0.003 0.004 
Penetration 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Export Share -0.078* -0.367*** -0.382*** -0.394*** -0.037 -0.210*** -0.159* 
 
 
(0.042) (0.058) (0.057) (0.059) (0.031) (0.041) (0.086) 
Uruguay  -0.146*** -0.279*** -0.268*** -0.274*** -0.298*** -0.334*** -0.121*** 
Round 
 
(0.041) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) 
Obs 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
R-squared (within) 0.3625 0.3563 0.3598 0.3413 0.3631 0.3094 0.4372 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2827 0.2757 0.2796 0.2588 0.2834 0.2230 0.3667 
F-statistic 38.8546 31.5153 34.8735 32.5000 32.6390 28.5930 45.8569 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 80 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1987-2005). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Uruguay Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1993). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across 
country, is included as alternatives to the decisive national government framework.  Regressions are based on data 
for the country whose most influential characteristic, lies at the relevant percentile. All regressions are weighted by 
the number of votes each country has in the Council of Ministers. 
 
